000 00987nam a2200205 a 4500
005 20160303154339.0
008 141201s2006 xx 000 0 und d
020 _a9780521858465
040 _aMAIN
041 _aEnglish
082 _a341
_bSCO/LIM
100 _aScott, Robert E.
245 _aLimits of leviathan :
_bcontract theory and the enforcement of international law
_cby Robert E. Scott and Paul B. Stephan.
260 _aNew York :
_bCambridge university press,
_c2006.
300 _a255 p.
500 _aTable of contents: Chapter 1. Introduction Chapter 2. States, firms and the enforcement of international law Chapter 3. Lessons from contract theory Chapter 4. A model of optimal enforcement Chapter 5. Patterns of international law enforcement Chapter 6. The choice between formal and informal enforcement Chapter 7. The future of international law enforcement.
650 _aInternational and municipal law.
700 _aStephan, Paul B.
942 _cBK
999 _c7556
_d7556