000 | 00987nam a2200205 a 4500 | ||
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005 | 20160303154339.0 | ||
008 | 141201s2006 xx 000 0 und d | ||
020 | _a9780521858465 | ||
040 | _aMAIN | ||
041 | _aEnglish | ||
082 |
_a341 _bSCO/LIM |
||
100 | _aScott, Robert E. | ||
245 |
_aLimits of leviathan : _bcontract theory and the enforcement of international law _cby Robert E. Scott and Paul B. Stephan. |
||
260 |
_aNew York : _bCambridge university press, _c2006. |
||
300 | _a255 p. | ||
500 | _aTable of contents: Chapter 1. Introduction Chapter 2. States, firms and the enforcement of international law Chapter 3. Lessons from contract theory Chapter 4. A model of optimal enforcement Chapter 5. Patterns of international law enforcement Chapter 6. The choice between formal and informal enforcement Chapter 7. The future of international law enforcement. | ||
650 | _aInternational and municipal law. | ||
700 | _aStephan, Paul B. | ||
942 | _cBK | ||
999 |
_c7556 _d7556 |