000			02047nam a22001931i 4500
005			20220507172020.0
008			150326s2015 enk ob 001 0 eng d
020			_a9781474201186
040			_aMAIN
100	1		_aKyritsis, Dimitrios,
245	1	0	_aShared authority : _bcourts and legislatures in legal theory _h[electronic resource] / _cby Dimitrios Kyritsis.
300			_a1 online resource (viii, 172 pages).
500			_aBloomsbury Pub Ebook
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
520			_a"This important new book advances a fresh philosophical account of the relationship between the legislature and courts, opposing the common conception of law, in which it is legislatures that primarily create the law, and courts that primarily apply it. This conception has eclectic affinities with legal positivism, and although it may have been a helpful intellectual tool in the past, it now increasingly generates more problems than it solves. For this reason, the author argues, legal philosophers are better off abandoning it. At the same time they are asked to dismantle the philosophical and doctrinal infrastructure that has been based on it and which has been hitherto largely unquestioned. In its place the book offers an alternative framework for understanding the role of courts and the legislature; a framework which is distinctly anti-positivist and which builds on Ronald Dworkin's interpretive theory of law. But, contrary to Dworkin, it insists that legal duty is sensitive to the position one occupies in the project of governing; legal interpretation is not the solitary task of one super-judge, but a collaborative task structured by principles of institutional morality such as separation of powers. Moreover in this collaborative task, different participants have a moral duty to respect each other's contributions."--Bloomsbury Publishing.
650		0	_aLaw (Philosophical concept)
856	4	0	_uhttps://doi.org/10.5040/9781474201186?locatt=label:secondary_bloomsburyCollections
942			_cEBK
999			_c17478 _d17478