000 01975nam a22002291i 4500
005 20220507121515.0
008 140929s2001 enk ob 001 0 eng d
020 _a9781472562364
040 _aMAIN
082 0 0 _a340/.1
100 1 _aDickson, Julie,
245 1 0 _aEvaluation and legal theory
_h[electronic resource] /
_cJulie Dickson ; general editor John Gardner.
300 _a1 online resource (xii, 148 pages).
500 _aBloomsbury Pub Ebook
504 _aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
520 _a"If Raz and Dworkin disagree over how law should be characterised,how are we, their jurisprudential public, supposed to go about adjudicating between the rival theories which they offer us? To what considerations would those theorists themselves appeal in order to convince us that their accounts of law are accurate and successful? Moreover, what is it that makes an account of law successful? Evaluation and Legal Theory tackles methodological or meta-theoretical issues such as these, and does so via attempting to answer the question: to what extent, and in what sense, must a legal theorist make value judgements about his data in order to construct a successful theory of law? Dispelling the obfuscatory myth that legal positivism seeks a 'value-free' account of law, the author attempts to explain and defend Joseph Razs position that evaluation is essential to successful legal theory, whilst refuting John Finnis and Ronald Dworkins contentions that the legal theorist must morally evaluate and morally justify the law in order to properly explain its nature. The book does not claim to solve the many mysteries of meta-legal theory but does seek to contribute to and engender rigorous and focused debate on this topic."--Bloomsbury Publishing.
650 0 _aLaw
650 0 _aValues.
700 1 _aGardner, John,
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.5040/9781472562364?locatt=label:secondary_bloomsburyCollections
942 _cEBK
999 _c17421
_d17421